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Economic Inequality: Is it Natural ?
Arnab Chatterjee,1, ∗ Sitabhra Sinha,2, † and Bikas K. Chakrabarti1, ‡
1Theoretical Condensed Matter Physics Division and Centre for Applied Mathematics and Computational Science,
Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 1/AF Bidhannagar, Kolkata 700 064, India.
2Institute of Mathematical Sciences, C. I. T. Campus, Taramani, Chennai 600 113, India.
Mounting evidences are being gathered suggesting that income and wealth distribution in various
countries or societies follow a robust pattern, close to the Gibbs distribution of energy in an ideal
gas in equilibrium, but also deviating significantly for high income groups. Application of physics
models seem to provide illuminating ideas and understanding, complimenting the observations.
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We are all aware of the hard fact: neither wealth nor income is ever uniform for us all. Justified or not, they are
unevenly distributed; few are rich, many are poor! Such socioeconomic inequalities seem to be a persistent fact of life
ever since civilization began. Can it be that it only reflects a simple natural law, understandable from the application
of physics?
I. Income and wealth distributions in society
Investigations over more than a century and the recent availability of electronic databases of income and wealth
distribution (ranging from national sample survey of household assets to the income tax return data available from
governmental agencies) have revealed some remarkable features. Irrespective of many differences in culture, history,
social structure, indicators of relative prosperity (such as gross domestic product or infant mortality) and, to some
extent, the economic policies followed in different countries, the income distribution seems to follow a particular
universal pattern, as does the wealth distribution: After an initial rise, the number density of people rapidly decays
with their income, the bulk described by a Gibbs or log-normal distribution crossing over at the very high income
range (for 5-10% of the richest members of the population) to a power law with an exponent (known as Pareto
exponent) value between 1 and 3. This seems to be an universal feature: from ancient Egyptian society 1 through
nineteenth century Europe 2,3 to modern Japan 4,5. The same is true across the globe today: from the advanced
capitalist economy of USA 4,5 to the developing economy of India 6.
The power-law tail, indicating a much higher frequency of occurrence of very rich individuals (or households) than
would be expected by extrapolating the properties of the bulk of the distribution, was first observed by Vilfredo
Pareto 2 in the 1890s for income distribution of several societies at very different stages of economic development.
Later, the wealth distribution was also seen to follow similar behavior. Subsequently, there have been several attempts
starting around the 1950s, mostly by economists, to explain the genesis of the power law tail (for a review, see
Champernowne 3). However, most of these models involved a large number of factors that made understanding the
essential reason behind the occurrence of inequality difficult. Following this period of activity, a relative lull followed
in the 70s and 80s when the field lay dormant, although accurate and extensive data were accumulated that would
eventually make possible precise empirical determination of the distribution properties. This availability of large
quantity of electronic data and their computational analysis has led to a recent resurgence of interest in the problem,
specifically over the last one and half decade.
Although Pareto 2 and Gini 7 had respectively identified the power-law tail and the log-normal bulk of the income
distribution, the demonstration of both features in the same distribution was possibly first demonstrated by Montroll
and Shlesinger 8 through an analysis of fine-scale income data obtained from the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
for the year 1935-36. It was observed that while the top 2-3 % of the population (in terms of income) followed a power
law with Pareto exponent ν ≃ 1.63; the rest followed a log-normal distribution. Later work on Japanese personal
income data based on detailed records obtained from the Japanese National Tax Administration indicated that the
tail of the distribution followed a power law with ν value that fluctuated from year to year around the mean value
of 2 9. Further work 10 showed that the power law region described the top 10 % or less of the population (in terms
of income), while the remaining income distribution was well-described by the log-normal form. While the value
of ν fluctuated significantly from year to year, it was observed that the parameter describing the log-normal bulk,
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2the Gibrat index, remained relatively unchanged. The change of income from year to year, i.e., the growth rate as
measured by the log ratio of the income tax paid in successive years, was observed by Fujiwara et al 11 to be also
a heavy tailed distribution, although skewed, and centered about zero. Later work on the US income distribution
based on data from IRS for the years 1997-1998, while still indicating a power-law tail (with ν ≃ 1.7), have suggested
that the the lower 95 % of the population have income whose distribution may be better described by an exponential
form 12,13. The same observation has been made for income distribution in the UK for the years 1994-1999, where the
value of ν was found to vary between 2.0 and 2.3, but the bulk seemed to be well-described by an exponential decay.
Box 1: Income inequality: Gini coefficient and Pareto law
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(a) The Gini coefficient G gives a measure of inequality in any income distribution and is defined as the proportional area
between the Lorenz curve (I , giving the cumulative fraction of the people with the fraction of wealth) and the perfect equality
curve (E, where the fraction of wealth possessed by any fraction of population would be strictly linear): G = 1 − AI
AE
, where
AI and AE are the areas under curves I and E respectively. G = 0 corresponds to perfect equality while G = 1 to perfect
inequality. (b) When one plots the cumulative wealth (income) distribution against the wealth (income), almost 90−95% of the
population fits the Gibbs distribution (indicated by the shaded region in the distribution; often fitted also to lognormal form)
and for the rest (very rich) 5− 10% of the population in any country, the number density falls off with their wealth (income)
much slowly, following a power law, called the Pareto law. The second part of this law, which we do not discuss here, states
that about 40 − 60% of the total wealth of any economy is possessed by 5 − 10% of the people in the Pareto tail. Although
this seems to be qualitatively true, we do not have any recent data to support it.
It is interesting to note that, when one shifts attention from the income of individuals to the income of companies,
one still observes the power law tail. A study of the income distribution of Japanese firms 14 concluded that it follows
a power law with ν ≃ 1, which is also often referred to as the Zipf’s law. Similar observation has been reported for
the income distribution of US companies 15.
Compared to the empirical work done on income distribution, relatively few studies have looked at the distribution
of wealth, which consist of the net value of assets (financial holdings and/or tangible items) owned at a given point in
time. The lack of an easily available data source for measuring wealth, analogous to income tax returns for measuring
income, means that one has to resort to indirect methods. Levy and Solomon 16 used a published list of wealthiest
people to generate a rank-order distribution, from which they inferred the Pareto exponent for wealth distribution in
USA. Refs. 13 and 17 used an alternative technique based on adjusted data reported for the purpose of inheritance
tax to obtain the Pareto exponent for UK. Another study used tangible asset (namely house area) as a measure of
wealth to obtain the wealth distribution exponent in ancient Egyptian society during the reign of Akhenaten (14th
century BC) 1. More recently, the wealth distribution in India at present was also observed to follow a power law
tail with the exponent varying around 0.9 6. The general feature observed in the limited empirical study of wealth
distribution is that of a power law behavior for the wealthiest 5-10 % of the population, and exponential or log-normal
distribution for the rest of the population. The Pareto exponent as measured from the wealth distribution is found
to be always lower than the exponent for the income distribution, which is consistent with the general observation
that, in market economies, wealth is much more unequally distributed than income 18. The striking regularities (see
Fig. 1) observed in the income distribution for different countries, have led to several new attempts at explaining them
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FIG. 1: (A) Cumulative probability (Q(m)) of US personal annual income (m) for IRS data for 2001 (taken from Ref. 19 (a)),
Pareto exponent ν ≈ 1.5 (given by the slope of the solid line). (B) Cumulative Income distribution in India during 1929-1930,
collected from Income Tax and Super Tax data20. The inset shows the cumulative distribution of the employment income for
the top 422 salaried Indians (Business Standard survey, 2006) showing a power-law tail with ν = 1.75±0.0121 . (C) Cumulative
probability distribution of Japanese personal income in the year 2000. The power law region approximately fits to ν = 1.96
(data from Ref. 19 (b)). (D) Cumulative probability distribution of firm size (total-assets) in France in the year 2001 for 669620
firms. The power law region approximately fits to ν = 0.84 (data from Ref. 19 (b)).
on theoretical grounds. Much of the current impetus is from physicists’ modelling of economic behavior in analogy
with large systems of interacting particles, as treated, e.g., in the kinetic theory of gases. According to physicists
working on this problem, the regular patterns observed in the income (and wealth) distribution may be indicative of
a natural law for the statistical properties of a many-body dynamical system representing the entire set of economic
interactions in a society, analogous to those previously derived for gases and liquids. By viewing the economy as a
thermodynamic system, one can identify the income distribution with the distribution of energy among the particles
in a gas. In particular, a class of kinetic exchange models have provided a simple mechanism for understanding the
unequal accumulation of assets. Many of these models, while simple from the perspective of economics, has the benefit
of coming to grips with the key factor in socioeconomic interactions that results in very different societies converging
to similar forms of unequal distribution of resources (see Refs. 4,5, which consists of a collection of large number of
technical papers in this field; see also 22−24 for some popular discussions and also criticisms).
II. A simple ideal gas like model
Think of an exchange game like the following in an economy where the different commodities are not being explicitly
considered, but rather their value in terms of an uniform asset (money). In such an asset exchange game, there are
N players participating, with each player having an initial capital of one unit of money. N is very large, and total
money M = N remains fixed over the game as does the number of players N .
(a) In the simplest version, the only allowed move at any time is that two of these players are randomly chosen
and they decide to divide their pooled resources randomly among them. As no debt is allowed, none of the players
can end up with a negative amount of assets. As one can easily guess, the initial delta function distribution of money
(with every player having the same amount) gets destabilized with such moves and the state of perfect equality, where
every player has the same amount, disappears quickly. Let us ask, what will be the eventual steady state distribution
of assets among the players after many such moves? The answer is well established in physics for more than a century
— soon, there will be a stable asset distribution and it will be the Gibbs distribution: P (m) ∼ exp[−m/T ], where
4the parameter T =M/N corresponds to the average money owned by an agent 25−27.
(b) Now think of a modified move in this game: each player ‘saves’ a fraction λ of his/her total assets during every
step of the game, the rest being pooled and randomly divided with the other (randomly chosen) player. If everybody
saves the same fraction λ, what is the steady state distribution of assets after a large number of such moves? It
becomes Gamma-function like, whose parameters of course depend on λ: P (m) ≃ mα exp[−m/T (λ)]; α = 3λ/(1−λ),
(see 27,28). Angle, utilizing a different stochastic model, arrived at somewhat similar (numerical) results, considerably
earlier 29,30. Although qualitative explanation and limiting results for λ → 0 or λ → 1 are easy to obtain, no exact
treatment of this problem is available so far.
Box 2: Kinetic theory of ideal gas: Gibbs and Maxwell-Boltzamann distributions
0
D(E)
f(E)
E
In a classical ideal gas in thermodynamic equilibrium, the state variables like pressure (P ), volume (V ) and the absolute
temperature (T ) maintains a very simple relationship PV = NkT . Here N is the number of basic constituents (atoms or
molecules; N ∼ Avogadro numer ∼ 1023) and k is a constant called Boltzmann constant. Statistical mechanics of ideal gas,
also called the kinetic theory of gas, intends to explain the above gas law in terms of the constituents’ mechanics or kinetics.
According to this picture, for a classical ideal gas, each constituent is a Newtonian particle and they undergo random elastic
collisions (which conserve kinetic energy E) among themselves and the walls of the container. These collisions eventually
set up a non-uniform (kinetic) energy distribution D(E) among the constituents, called the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution:
D(E) = f(E)g(E), where g(E) (∼
√
E here for an ideal gas in a 3-dimensional container) is called the density of states and
comes from mechanics (of free or noninteracting particles of the ideal gas), and f(E) (∼ exp(−E/kT )) is called the Gibbs
distribution and comes from the statistical mechanics (result of averages over random scattering events). Identifying the
pressure P as the average (over the distribution D(E)) rate of change of momentum of the gas particles on unit area of the
container (where the energy E is proportional to the square of the momentum), and the temperature T as the average (over
the distribution D(E)) energy, one immediately gets the above mentioned gas law (relating P , V and T ).
(c) What happens to the steady-state asset distribution among these players if λ is not the same for all players
but is different for different players? Let the distribution ρ(λ) of saving propensity λ among the agents be such that
ρ(λ) is non-vanishing when λ → 1. The actual asset distribution P (m) in such a model will depend on the saving
propensity distribution ρ(λ), but for all of them the asymptotic form of the distribution will become Pareto-like:
P (m) ∼ m−(1+ν); ν = 1 for m → ∞ 31−33. This is valid for all such distributions (unless ρ(λ) ∝ (1 − λ)δ, when
P (m) ∼ m−(2+δ) 32). However, for variation of ρ(λ) such that ρ(λ) = 0 for λ < λ0 and ρ(λ) 6= 0 for λ0 < λ < 1, one
will get an initial Gamma function form for P (m) for small and intermediate values of m, with parameters determined
by λ0 (6= 0), and this distribution will eventually become Pareto-like for m → ∞ with ν = 1 (see Fig. 2; cf.
31−33).
Analytical understanding is now available 34,35 and Ref. 36 gives a somewhat rigorous analytical treatment of this
problem.
It may be mentioned that there are a large number of random multiplicative asset exchange models (see. e.g, 37,38)
to explain the Pareto (power-law) tail of the wealth or income distribution. The advantage of the kind of model
discussed above is that it can accommodate all the essential features of P (m) for the entire range of m, not only the
Pareto tail.
(d) One can of course argue that the random division of pooled assets among players is not a realistic approximation
5FIG. 2: (A) The trading markets can be easily modelled to be composed of two-body scatterings as shown above: The money
mi(t) of an agent i at time t changes due to trading/scattering with a random agent j in the market; the scattering locally
conserves the total money. Each agent saves a fraction λi of its money mi(t) at that time t and the same is true for the other,
and the rest of the money (1 − λi)mi(t) + (1 − λj)mj(t) is shared randomly (ǫ is a random fraction between 0 and 1). We
assume ǫ to be an annealed variable (changes with trading or time), while λ are quenched variables (do not change with time).
λi can of course change from agent to agent, given by its distribution ρ(λ). (B) For uniform λ, a Gamma distribution P (m) for
money occurs, (C) while for a white distribution of λ, a Pareto law P (m) ∼ m−2 (i.e. Pareto exponent ν = 1) sets in. Asset
distribution in the asymmetric asset exchange game where the players have different thrift values (randomly chosen from an
uniform distribution over the unit interval) also exhibits a power law tail, as shown in (D), with Pareto exponent ν ≃ 1.5. In
comparing with the cumulative probability Q(m) in Fig. 1, one should note that Q(m) is given by
R ∞
m
P (m)dm.
of actual trading carried out in society. As Hayes 22 points out, in most exchanges between an individual and a large
company, it is unlikely that the individual will end up with a significant fraction of the latter’s assets. A strict
enforcement of this condition leads to a new type of game, the minimum exchange model, where the maximum
amount that can change hands over a move, is a fraction of the poorer player’s assets. Although the change in the
rules does not seem significant from the simple random exchange game, the outcome is astonishingly different: in the
steady state, one player ends up with all the assets.
If we now relax the condition that the richer player does not completely dictate the terms of exchange, so that the
amount exchanged need not be limited by the total asset owned by the poorer player, we arrive at a game which is
asymmetric in the sense of generally favoring the player who is richer than the other, but not so much that the richer
player dominates totally. Just like the previously defined savings propensity for a player, one can now define ‘thrift’
τ , which measures the ability of a player to exploit its advantage over a poorer player 20. For the two extreme cases
of minimum (τ = 0) and maximum (τ = 1) thrift, one gets back the random asset exchange and minimum asset
exchange models, respectively. However, close to the maximum limit, at the transition between the two very different
steady-state distributions given by the two models, we see a power-law distribution! As in the case of λ, we can now
6consider the case when instead of having the same τ , different players are endowed with different thrift abilities. For
such heterogeneous thrift assignment in the population, where τ for each player is chosen from a random distribution,
the steady-state distribution reproduces the entire range of observed distributions of income (as well as wealth) in the
society: the tail follows a power law, while the bulk is described by an exponential distribution. The tail exponent
depends on the distribution of τ , with the value of ν = 1.5 suggested originally by Pareto, obtained for the simplest
case of uniform distribution of τ between [0,1] (see Fig. 2 D). However, even extremely different distributions of τ (e.g.,
U-shaped) always produces a power-law tailed distribution that is exponentially decaying in the bulk, underlining the
robustness of the model in explaining inequality.
III. An extension
A major limitation of these asset exchange models considered earlier (and summarized above in Sec. II ) is that it
does not make any explicit reference to the commodities exchanged whose asset values we were considering so far and
to the constraints they impose. We have also studied 39 the effect of explicitly introducing a single non-consumable
commodity (which is bought and sold in terms of money) on the asset distributions in the steady state. Here, again
two of the agents are arbitrarily chosen for interaction (or trading) and the commodity exchanged for money, provided
of course the two agents have the required amounts of commodity and money (since no credit purchases are allowed).
Otherwise, no exchange take place and a new pair of agents is chosen. The global price of the commodity (ratio of
total money to total amount of the commodity in the market) is normalized but have temporal fluctuations. Here,
we distinguish between money and wealth; wealth of any agent is composed of money and the money equivalent of
the commodity with the agent. In spite of many significant effects, the general feature of Gamma-like form of the
asset distributions (for uniform λ) and the power law tails (for random λ) for both money and wealth, with identical
exponents, are seen to remain unchanged.
These studies indicate that the precise studies (theories) for the asset exchange models are extremely useful and
relevant. Also this helps us to address the question of identifying a money-like asset with wealth in simple asset
exchange models and suggests that the absurd simplicity can be relaxed, yet the quantitative features are not affected.
IV. Relevance of gas like models
All these gas-like models of trading markets are based on the assumption of (a) asset conservation (globally in the
market; as well as locally in any trading) and (b) stochasticity. Questions on the validity of these points are very
natural and have been raised 4,5,40. We now forward some arguments in their favor.
(a) Asset conservation: If we view the trading as scattering processes, one can see the equivalence. Of course, in any
such ‘asset exchange’ trading process, one receives some profit or service from the other and this does not appear to be
completely random, as assumed in the models. However, if we concentrate only on the ‘cash’ exchanged (even using
Bank cards!), every trading is an asset conserving one (like the elastic scattering process in physics!) As discussed
in Sec. III, conservation of asset can be extended to that of total wealth (including money) and relaxed, as given by
the temporally fluctuating price (effectively allows for slight relaxation over this conservation), yet keeping the overall
distribution same (with unchanged ν value) 39. It is also important to note that the frequency of asset exchange in
such models define a time scale in which the total asset in the market does not change. In real economies, the total
asset changes much slowly, so that in the time scale of exchanges, it is quite reasonable to assume the total asset to
be conserved in these exchange models.
(b) Stochasticity: But, are these trading random? Surely not, when looked upon from individual’s point of view.
When one maximizes his/her utility by money exchange for the p-th commodity, he/she may choose to go to the q-th
agent and for the r-th commodity he/she will go to the s-th agent. But since p 6= q 6= r 6= s in general, when viewed
from a global level, these trading/scattering events will all look random (although for individuals this is a defined
choice or utility maximization). It may be noted in this context that in the stochastically formulated ideal gas models
in physics (developed in late 1800/early 1900), physicists already knew for more than a hundred years that each of
the constituent particle (molecule) follows a precise equation of motion, namely that due to Newton. The assumption
of stochasticity in asset exchange models, even though each agent might follow an utility maximizing strategy (like
Newton’s equation of motion for molecules), is therefore not very unusual in the context.
(c) Support from economic data: Analysis of high quality income data 41 from UK and USA show peaked Gamma
distributions for the low and middle income ranges, which suggest a strong case in favor of the models discussed in
II(b)-(d) 20,27,32. This has already been seen in studies of isolated groups of similar individuals, and has been modelled
in similar fashion 29,30.
V. Concluding remarks
The enormous amount of data available on the income and wealth distribution of various countries clearly establish a
robust feature: Gamma (or log-normal) distribution for the majority (almost 90-95%), followed by a Pareto power law
(for the richest 5-10% of the population), as seen in Fig. 1. We show that this ‘natural’ behavior of income inequality
7comes from a simple ‘scattering picture’ of the market (see Fig. 2 A), when the agent in the market have got random
saving propensity. Models studied in physics (in kinetic theory of gases), more than a hundred years ago, help us in
formulating and understanding these ‘natural’ behavior of the markets.
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